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and Unmaking of the Killing Bodhisattva
Jan-ulrich soBisch
In indian Mahayana Buddhism, the vows of the bodhisattvas were codi-  fied according to two systems. The first is called “mind only” or “vast 
conduct” and is said to go back to Maitreya Buddha and Asaṅga (ca. 320–
ca. 390). The second is called the “middle way” or “profound view” and is 
said to go back to Mañjugoṣa Bodhisattva and Nāgārjuna (fl. ca. 2nd–3rd 
c.). In this way, people ascribe the Bodhisattvabhūmi of Asaṅga and the 
Bodhisattvasaṃvaraviṃśaka of Ācārya Candragomin (fl. 5th c.) to the Mind 
Only system and the Śikṣāsamuccaya and Bodhicaryāvatāra of Śāntideva 
(ca. late 7th–mid 8th c.) to the Middle Way system. The two systems differ 
in some ways and provide different lists of the actual vows, but the present 
essay is not directly concerned with the vows proper, but rather with how 
Buddhists have interpreted these vows and how such interpretations are 
influenced by or interact with other aspects of Buddhism. As the title of this 
essay suggests, the primary focus is on the precept of not killing and how 
this is affected by and interacts with such notions as karma, skillful means, 
and compassion in the different interpretations. The developments that I 
describe here for Indian Buddhism should be seen as a parallel to what 
Ulrich Pagel established in his study of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka.1 He observed 
an early phase of Mahayana sutras where śrāvaka morality is still the great-
est influence on the bodhisattvas’ disciplined conduct. Later, however, the 
idea of a special code of conduct for bodhisattvas was increasingly adapted 
to the newly developing ideal of benefitting all sentient beings and to a new 
way of viewing reality as characterized chiefly by non-duality. These new 
developments led to a gradual devaluation of the śrāvaka type of morality 
1 Pagel 1995.
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and to the emergence of a special code of conduct of the bodhisattvas that 
claims skillful means and compassion as its guiding principles. In the last 
part of this essay, I will introduce a Tibetan attempt to reconcile skillful 
means with earlier Buddhist ideas of karma and morality in the training of 
bodhisattvas.
The first Western editions and translations of Mahayana sutras, compen-
dia such as the Śikṣāsamuccaya, and treatises like the Bodhisattvabhūmi 
introduced to us the idea of bodhisattvas who deliberately transgress the 
basic rules and norms of Buddhism such as not killing, not stealing, and 
maintaining celibacy. Since then, many stories of the “compassionate kill-
ing” of a living being have been mentioned, retold, and analyzed numerous 
times in Western academic literature, not always with the necessary atten-
tion to their complex details. The available Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan 
versions of such stories with their various occurrences in different sutras, 
treatises, and compendia, and the various manuscript editions, surely tell 
quite different stories that have different foci and probably different agen-
das. In this essay, I would first like to pinpoint the tensions these stories 
create vis-à-vis the teachings of early Buddhism and the Abhidharma lit-
erature, chiefly with reference to the research of Rupert Gethin. After that, 
I will discuss the problem of karmic fruition in the context of the transgres-
sion of the bodhisattva who is the hero of these stories, and the question of 
the role of skillful means and compassion. In the last part of the essay, the 
ideas of a Tibetan master of the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries 
will be introduced, a period which I would describe as the end of the initial 
phase of the later spread ( phyi dar) of Buddhism in Tibet. This master’s 
attempts to provide a solution to the problem that satisfies both the speci-
fications of the early suttas and the Abhidharma literature on the one hand 
and the Mahayanistic impulses of these stories on the other are of consider-
able interest for the study of the formation of Tibetan Buddhist traditions 
during that period.
KILLING IN PALI SOURCES
In 2004, Rupert Gethin published his investigation into the problem of 
compassionate killing in Pali sources. I want to show, by presenting some 
aspects of Gethin’s analysis, that killing is necessarily perceived as a trans-
gression in these sources, that the Pali commentators and the earlier and 
later Abhidharma texts explain that killing must have a moment of aversion 
at its root, and that such a moment of aversion cannot coincide with com-
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passion. Whether such an exegesis of the Buddha’s teachings is correct, as 
Damien Keown2 doubts, is not the point. For my discussion in the later sec-
tions of this essay, I am chiefly interested in the fact that some Mahayana 
texts seem to override the axiomatic settings of the earlier sources and in 
how they either skirt or address that problem. Moreover, awareness of this 
ancient exegetical background is also necessary to be able to fully appreci-
ate the efforts of the Tibetan author that I will introduce later. Let me now 
briefly summarize Gethin’s findings.3
Pali Suttas
Gethin first establishes the precept of abandoning killing and avoiding harm 
for living beings as one of the courses of the ten virtuous actions, one of the 
“rightful actions,” and, again, the first of the five precepts. He also shows 
that the Buddha advises his disciples to refrain from killing in such canonical 
discourses as the Brahmajāla Sutta 4 and the Suttanipāta.5 The results of kill-
ing, namely states of misfortune, unhappy destinies, and birth in hell are also 
well known, as mentioned in the Cūḷa-Kammavibhaṅga Sutta.6 Moreover, 
monks or nuns who intentionally kill a human being would automatically 
commit an “offence leading to expulsion” ( pārājika) and lose their vows.7
Of great importance for our present purpose is Gethin’s analysis of the 
mental state of people who commit such acts, since this state is pivotal in 
the context of the problem of whether a karmic result will accrue. Generally 
speaking, to be karmically effective, an act has to be intended.8 By a similar 
token, the status of a person’s vows depends on the clarity of the mind at 
the moment of an act.9
Commentaries and Pali Abhidhamma
These points are still further clarified in the commentaries and the Pali 
Abhidhamma. In at least five works, Gethin found the explanation that 
2 Keown 2016.
3 Gethin 2004, pp. 167‒88.
4 D vol. 1, pp. 3–4. 
5 SN verse 394. For more Pali sources on abstaining from killing, see Schmithausen 
1999, p. 45, n. 1. 
6 M vol. 3, p. 203.
7 Vin vol. 3, p. 73. 
8 A vol. 3, p. 415. 
9 Vin vol. 3, p. 73.
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“the act of killing has five components: a living being, the perception of 
the living being as such, the thought of killing, the action, and the death 
[of the being] as a result.”10 When these five come together, the course 
of action is complete, that is, the act is karmically efficient. Summarizing 
the Pali Abhidhamma, Gethin says that no matter what the circumstances, 
“the actual intention that directly leads to the act of killing is always moti-
vated by some kind of aversion. . . . [I]t is a psychological impossibility, a 
psychological contradiction in terms that one should, when motivated by 
nonattachment, friendliness (and wisdom), intentionally kill another living 
being.”11
To bring out that “psychological impossibility,” Gethin analyzes12 
what is, according to the Pali tradition, virtuous (kusala) and nonvirtuous 
(akusala).13 This is, Gethin says, really a question “about the nature of the 
motivations (hetu) that function as the roots (mūla) of and so underlie the 
intention or will (cetanā) to act.”14 Motivations and roots of nonvirtuous 
acts are greed (lobha), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha). These roots 
function as immediate or decisive (saniṭṭhāpaka) motivations. In short, 
at the decisive moment of an intentional act of killing, the act cannot be 
accompanied by any other consciousness than one that is rooted in aver-
sion, and “compassion is absent at the moment of the decisive intention in 
one who intends death.”15
Finally, regarding the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma, Gethin 
points out16 that the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, too, distinguishes between 
a general cause (hetu-samutthāna) and an immediate cause (tatkṣaṇa-
samutthāna), and between courses of action (karma-patha) and proper and 
preliminary (sāmantaka) or preparatory ( prayoga) acts.17 Here, too, the 
course of action (karma-patha) conducive to killing is exclusively accom-
plished by hatred.18 The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya also presents the five 
10 Gethin 2004, p. 172, quotes the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, vol. 1, pp. 69–70. 
11 Gethin 2004, p. 178.
12 Gethin 2004, pp. 176–80. 
13 For a philological analysis of the original meaning of kuśala and akuśala, see 
Schmithausen 2013.
14  Gethin 2004, p. 180.
15 Gethin 2004, p. 182.
16 Gethin 2004, p. 188.
17 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ch. 4, pp. 10, 68. 
18 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ch. 4, v. 70 a–b. See also Bayer 2010, p. 179: “Accomplishment 
<of killing> [comes about] only through hatred. Because without mercilessness the killing of 
another being does not come about.” The addition in pointed brackets is mine.
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necessary components for the course of action19 that Gethin noted in Pali 
commentaries.
This brief recapitulation is crucial to understanding what exactly the 
bodhisattva, who is supposed to be allowed and able to intentionally kill 
with a compassionate motivation, is transgressing against, or from what he 
is exempted. It will then be of great interest to observe whether anyone who 
claims that the bodhisattva is exempted from these axiomatic foundations, 
or is supposed to get off scot-free from a transgression, addresses these 
problems, and if so, how.
KILLING IN MAHAYANA SOURCES
Now, according to the above analysis of Buddhist thought as visible in Pali 
commentaries and Abhidhamma texts, it should be impossible for anyone to 
commit an intentional act of killing with compassion as the decisive (Pali, 
saniṭṭhāpaka) motivation or immediate cause (Skt. tatkṣaṇa-samutthāna). 
Such an act, therefore, ought to have aversion as its root and misfortune as 
its fruit. Nevertheless, several Mahayana texts seem to teach cases where 
bodhisattvas intentionally kill an evil person, and their merit may even 
increase as a consequence of that act.
The Upāyakauśalya Mahāyānasūtra
One such text is the Upāyakauśalya Mahāyānasūtra. It contains the fre-
quently cited story of the bodhisattva captain “Great Compassionate,” who 
perceives in a dream that an evil person on his ship is about to kill the other 
five hundred merchants (who are also bodhisattvas). To prevent that person 
from committing this heinous crime, and thereby to save him from its dire 
consequences, and to protect the other merchants and prevent them from 
taking matters into their hands and committing a violent nonvirtuous act in 
self-defense, the bodhisattva himself decides to kill that person, accepting 
all negative consequences for himself:
“If I were to kill this person, I would, as a consequence, be born 
in the hell of beings and after that would have to bear birth in the 
great hell of beings for one-hundred-thousand eons. However, 
[at least] this person will not kill those merchants and [his] evil 
[karma] will not increase,” he thought. Sons of the family! It is 
like this: the captain [named] Great Compassionate intentionally 
19 Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ch. 4, v. 73 a–b.
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(Tib. ched du bsams; Skt. saṃcintya) killed that man with a spear 
with compassion and skill to protect those bodhisattvas [i.e., the 
other five hundred merchants]. I was at that time that captain 
named Great Compassionate. Sons of the family! Through that 
skill in means and great compassion, I have turned my back on 
samsara for one-hundred-thousand eons. That person, too, died 
and was born in the heavenly world. Those five hundred mer-
chants on that ship were later the five hundred buddhas of this 
fortunate eon. Sons of the family! What do you think? Is there the 
least veil of karma for the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who has turned 
his back on samsara for one-hundred-thousand eons through the 
gnosis of skill in means? Sons of the family! You should not view 
it in that way!20
Note that the bodhisattva captain assumes from the outset that he will be 
born as a consequence of the killing in hell for one-hundred-thousand eons, 
yet that seems to be acceptable because neither the other merchants will be 
killed nor does the evil person’s demerit increase further. This is, so far, in 
accord with the analysis of Pali and Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika Buddhism.
Note furthermore that the bodhisattva kills intentionally and with com-
passion and skill in means. The question must be raised, however, wherein 
exactly lies the skill in means and what is the role and place of compassion? 
Is it the bodhisattva’s special skill, as is often assumed in Western writing, 
that he kills motivated by nothing but compassion (hence, “compassionate 
killing”)? If that were the case, the crucial point of the story is that he is 
able to avoid a negative outcome for himself because of the wholesomeness 
of compassion. Compassion would, as one Indian author explained in the 
thirteenth century, “outshine” the evil deed of killing like the moon out-
shines the stars.21 Our sutra, however, does not seem to specify a function 
to compassion except for merely being a general motivation at the basis, or 
in the background, of the whole event. The principal device in this sutra is, 
as the title already suggests, clearly “skill in means.” The specific skillful 
means of the bodhisattva appears to be that even by the nonvirtuous act of 
20 Upāyakauśalya Mahāyānasūtra, Derge vol. 66, fols. 304r, line 6, p. 607, line 6. For an 
alternate translation of this passage see Tatz 1994, p. 74.
21 In this example employed by the Paṇḍita Vibhūticandra (1170–1230), a disciple of the 
famous Mahā Paṇḍita (“great scholar”) Śākyaśrībhadra, the stars are the prātimokṣa vows 
and the moon signifies the overpowering qualities of the bodhisattva vows; see Sobisch 
2002, pp. 79–129, esp. p. 121. 
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killing, he is able to cause benefit for the evil person, so that not only will 
the latter not be born in hell, but rather in the heavenly world instead.
The consequences of that skillful act are described as follows: (1) The 
evil person is not accumulating even more evil and is born in the heavenly 
world; (2) The lives of the five hundred merchants are protected, and they 
do not need to commit a violent nonvirtuous deed to protect themselves. 
Moreover, they are thus not impeded by the consequences of such a deed on 
their path to buddhahood; and (3) For the bodhisattva himself, the period of 
his stay in samsara is reduced by one-hundred-thousand eons.
Note that, other than at the beginning of the passage, negative conse-
quences for the bodhisattva are not mentioned. Instead, his remaining time 
in samsara is reduced (just like a criminal’s sentence is reduced because of 
good conduct). The causes for these results are mentioned twice. First, in 
a general way, the whole outcome is said to be caused by “skill in means 
and great compassion.” In the final sentence, however, the “earlier release 
from samsara” of the bodhisattva captain is specifically connected with 
the “gnosis of skill in means”—without mentioning compassion anymore. 
This seems to suggest that the positive outcome for the bodhisattva himself 
occurs because of the skillful act through which he prevented the death of 
his fellow merchants and established the evil person in a heavenly world. 
We may, therefore, speak of two levels of results: (1) The bodhisattva 
directly and skillfully brings about the benefit for others and ensures their 
protection, good rebirth, and unimpeded development; (2) Through the 
merit arising from such benefitting of others he indirectly achieves a good 
result for himself.
If we take the absence of the term “compassion” in the final sentence 
seriously, the essential factor through which the bodhisattva avoids nega-
tive and achieves positive consequences for himself must be the merit 
that arises from protecting and benefitting others. The role of compassion 
is merely that it makes the whole act possible in a general way in that it 
initially directs the bodhisattva’s attention to the fate of these beings and 
stimulates him to intervene. Compassion, therefore, largely seems to fulfill 
the function of a general initial motivation. Maybe “compassionate killing,” 
for which no Western author ever offered a Sanskrit or Tibetan source term, 
is a misnomer to begin with, and maybe we should rather speak of “skillful 
killing”?22
22 See Gray 2007, Jenkins 2010, and Schlieter 2006, to mention just a few.
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The Mahārahasyopāyakauśalya Mahāyānasūtra 23
Let us have a brief look at another version of this story from the 
Mahārahasyopāyakauśalya Mahāyānasūtra.24 The story is here presented 
with a few more words but appears to be basically the same. Two important 
details, however, were added.25
The first addition is that the bodhisattva not only expects to burn in hell 
for one-hundred-thousand eons, but states that he “shall happily endure 
that experience of suffering” (sdug bsngal myong bar ’gyur ba de la spro 
bar bya).26 This notion causes a certain tension with the abovementioned 
secondary level of results, that is, the bodhisattva’s earlier release from 
samsara caused by the merit accruing from protecting and benefitting oth-
ers. Such an earlier release from samsara seems to avoid suffering, but 
here, the bodhisattva actually happily endures his suffering when it is the 
result of benefitting others. Moreover, it not only further complicates the 
situation of the motivations in the text, but it also complicates the ques-
tion of which actual skill in means underlies the bodhisattva’s actions 
here. A bodhisattva who “happily endures suffering” (or even is only able 
to bear it) appears to have obtained a stage where he is able to cope with 
severe suffering, and that obviously modifies the skill in means that we 
have identified in the Upāyakauśalya. There, the skillful act was prin-
cipally that the bodhisattva was able to protect and benefit others even 
by an evil act such as killing. Here, in the Mahārahasyopāyakauśalya 
Mahāyānasūtra, an element of a capability to cope with adverse condi-
23 This sutra appears in the reference list under Sarvabuddha Mahārahasyopāyakauśalya 
Jñānottara Bodhisattvaparipṛcchāparivarta Mahāyānasūtra. The most important parts in 
the title are Mahārahasya (“great secret”) and Upāyakauśalya (“skill in means”). Sanskrit 
saṃdhi rules join the final sound of the first word (“a”) with the initial sound of the second 
(“u”), transforming both into an “o.”
24 Mahārahasyopāyakauśalya Mahāyānasūtra; this passage is in Derge vol. 44, fols. 61r–v, 
pp. 121–22. 
25 Tatz 1994, pp. 17–18, points out that the former version is “genuinely earlier” while the 
second version “displays systematic (i.e., commentarial) expansion, inflation of numbers, and 
alteration of concepts and terminology.” The Chinese version of the latter text is dated to 420 
CE.
26 The respective passage as quoted in the Śikṣāsamuccaya is this: utsoḍhavyam eva 
bhagavan bodhisattvenāpattim āpattuṃ tac ca nairayikaṃ duṣkhaṃ; ut-√sah, fut. pass. part., 
“to be endured” (Tib. spro bar bya), but arguably with the connotation “happily, willingly, 
readily.” In the Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra (see Vaidya 1959, p. 24), on the other hand, the Sanskrit 
utsoḍhavyaḥ has been translated into Tibetan as nyams su bzod nus. I would like to thank 
Sonam Spitz for bringing these passages to my attention. 
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tions is added because the expected suffering arising from killing will not 
affect him negatively (i.e., he will not lose his loving kindness for others 
even when he suffers). However, just as we begin to imagine a bodhisatt-
va with a superpower of patience and endurance, when the passage men-
tions the outcome for the bodhisattva (see below), no negative results are 
mentioned. One wonders, then, why he needs to be described as one who 
happily endures suffering (or as one who is at least capable of bearing 
it)? What is really achieved by adding this detail to the story? Perhaps it 
reflects a slightly different bodhisattva ideal, that is, one where not obtain-
ing perfect buddhahood is the focus, but rather the bodhisattva’s uncon-
ditional commitment to the well-being of sentient beings by remaining 
among them in the midst of samsara? However, the inclusion of such a 
(new?) focus in this story, if that is what happened, now creates a ten-
sion with the element of the earlier release from samsara. A somewhat 
paradoxical situation arises where the bodhisattva happily endures taking 
the suffering of others upon himself, but at the same time gains an earlier 
escape from samsara. 
The second addition occurs when the conclusion of the story is spelled 
out:
Do you think that the reducing of samsara [by] one-hundred-
thousand eons and abandoning it through skill in means and great 
compassion is the veil of karma of the bodhisattva? Do not view 
it in that way! View it as the very skill in means!27
Here, compassion is now explicitly mentioned together with skill in 
means as the cause of the bodhisattva’s reduction, and finally, his aban-
donment, of samsara. The Mahārahasya, however, does not explain how 
exactly compassion is supposed to function here, and our problems regard-
ing the psychological foundations as taught in the Pali sources and the 
Abhidharma of the Sarvāstivādin-Vaibhāṣika are neither addressed nor 
solved. In particular, the sutra does not mention whether or how compas-
sion plays a role in the actual act of killing. If compassion is supposed to be 
the general initial motivation as seems to be the case in the Upāyakauśalya, 
it is, of course, conceivable that it contributes to the arising of a positive 
result in a general sense. However, that compassion is described as an ele-
ment of “the very skill in means” that causes the positive outcome for the 
bodhisattva himself seems to be an unnecessary addition because the exact 
27 Mahārahasyopāyakauśalya, Derge vol. 44, fol. 61v, p. 122. 
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same positive result has been achieved in the Upāyakauśalya by merit 
derived from the skillful act of protecting and benefitting others alone.
Both additions do not contribute to an understanding of the story, but 
rather complicate it. The aspect of the happy endurance of the suffering, 
however, will play an important role in the teaching of the Tibetan master 
discussed in the last part of this essay.
The Bodhisattvabhūmi
The idea of a compassionately killing bodhisattva underwent further devel-
opments and transformations over time. In the Bodhisattvabhūmi,28 a high-
wayman is about to kill a large number of śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas, and 
bodhisattvas. To prevent that heinous crime and the highwayman’s going to 
hell, a bodhisattva intentionally kills him.
The vital point of this story, however, is that the bodhisattva takes care 
that either he himself or, alternatively, the highwayman (this point is con-
troversial) is in a virtuous or neutral state of mind at the moment of the 
killing. According to Lambert Schmithausen, a Sanskrit manuscript of 
the Bodhisattvabhūmi available to him clearly suggests a reading accord-
ing to which the bodhisattva kills the highwayman in a moment where the 
highwayman is either in a neutral or virtuous state of mind.29 This is to 
secure the highwayman’s obtainment of an immediate good rebirth.30 The 
Chinese- and Tibetan-language versions, however, are either ambiguous 
or contradict this interpretation.31 The commentator *Sāgaramegha (also 
known as *Samudramegha)32 clearly states that the neutral or virtuous state 
belongs to the bodhisattva, and he adds that the bodhisattva furthermore 
has to be free from affliction (Skt. akliṣṭa). Tsongkhapa (1357–1419) fol-
28 Bodhisattvabhūmi; see Dutt 1966, p. 113, line 23, p. 114, line 2. Derge vol. 129, fol. 
89b, line 2, p. 179, line 2.
29 Schmithausen 2007, pp. 428–29.
30 That the state of the mind at the moment of death is decisive is a widespread Buddhist 
view. Schmithausen (2007, p. 429 n. 20) provides some sources. According to Theravada 
Buddhism, even a person who has committed much evil might directly go to Tuṣita heaven, 
for which the example is given of King Duṭṭhagāmaṇi, who, having killed many Tamils in 
battle, was born in heaven. For interesting discussions of this point see Langer 2007, pp. 
14‒15, and Holt 1991, pp. 56‒59. That the state of mind at the moment of death is of great 
importance is also maintained by the Tibetan master Jigten Sumgön (’Jig rten gsum mgon; 
1143–1217), whose teachings will be discussed below.
31 Schmithausen 2007, p. 429, §2.4.
32 Derge vol. 133, fol. 169b, p. 339. 
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lows him in both respects.33 The crucial passage in the Tibetan text of the 
Bodhisattvabhūmi is this:
“If I kill this person, I will indeed be born in the hell of beings, 
but my being born in the hell of beings is imprudent (mdo med). If 
this being commits a heinous crime and goes to the hell of beings, 
that is [also] not acceptable.”34 If the bodhisattva—with such an 
intention and knowing that his mind is virtuous or neutral—kills 
that person with great caution (’dzem bzhin du) and only out of 
compassion concerning the future [consequences], not only will 
there not be any fault, but his merit will much increase.35
The text presents the case as a dilemma: it is imprudent for the bodhisatt-
va to be born in hell, and it is also not acceptable for a bodhisattva to allow 
the evil person to go to hell. The only way out is to act with the skill in 
means of an intentional killing. 
Here it is “imprudent” for the bodhisattva to be born in hell—a far cry 
from being happily able to endure it. The author seems to assume that such a 
birth would impede the bodhisattva’s loving kindness and thereby his career 
as a bodhisattva. May we conclude from this remark that the author had a 
bodhi-sattva in mind who has not yet reached the pure levels beyond the 
seventh bhūmi where fearlessness is obtained? I will return to this topic later.
The Bodhisattvabhūmi also adds another dimension to the bodhisattva’s 
skillfulness. He either takes care that the evil person is, at the moment of 
33 Schmithausen 2007, p. 429, §§3.2 and 3.3. See Tsong kha pa, Byang chub sems dpa’i 
sdom pa, fol. 71a, line 2, p. 142. 
34 From here onwards this passage was translated and discussed in Schmithausen 2007, 
pp. 429–30. I have rendered ’dzem bzhin du as “with great caution” strictly according to 
my understanding of the Tibetan term, while Schmithausen translates “schweren Herzens” 
(“with a heavy heart”), surely following the Sanskrit version (ṛtīyamānaḥ). The way I have 
seen the term ’dzem du employed in indigenous Tibetan texts in the context of karma is that 
it means that even someone with a high level of spiritual realization should be very attentive 
and cautious with regard to karmic consequences. Cf. Phag mo gru pa, gSung ’bum (’Bri 
gung manuscript), vol. 3, fol. 90v: rgyu ’bras nam mkha’ ltar rtogs kyang / rgyu ’bras phra 
zhing phra ba la ’dzem/ (“Even when one has realized cause and result to be like space [i.e., 
empty], one [continues to] pay very close attention to cause and result”); Phag mo gru pa, 
gSung ’bum (’Bri gung manuscript), vol. 3, fol. 163r: chos thams cad nam mkha’ dkyil ltar 
rtogs kyang las ’bras khyad du mi gsad/ (“Even having realized all phenomena to be like 
the centre of space, one does not disregard karma and result”); and rDo rje shes rab 2009, p. 
323: stong nyid rtogs nas las rgyu ’bras la ’dzem du ’gro dgos gsungs/ (“It is said: ‘Having 
realized emptiness, one must proceed very attentive to karma, cause, and result’”). 
35 Bodhisattvabhūmi, Derge vol. 129, fol. 89b, p. 179. 
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death, in a neutral or virtuous state (according to the Sanskrit manuscripts 
of the Bodhisattvabhūmi) or that the bodhisattva himself is in such a state of 
mind (according to the commentaries by *Sāgaramegha [*Samudramegha], 
and Tsongkhapa). Thus, if it is as per the first case, the skillful act includes 
the ability to perceive the mental state of the evil person at the moment 
of the killing to ensure his higher rebirth. If it is as per the second case, 
the skillful act of killing includes the ability to kill while the bodhisattva 
himself is in a neutral or virtuous state of mind, which evidently indicates 
that he has in mind the avoiding of negative consequences for himself. In 
the first case, it would strengthen the idea that merit arises from the killing 
because the bodhisattva skillfully ensures that the person to be killed not 
only avoids further demerit but is also reborn in heaven. This merit arising 
from protecting and benefitting others would then ensure a positive outcome 
for the bodhisattva himself. In the second case, the door would be open for 
the assumption that in the bodhisattva’s mind, compassion is present at the 
actual moment of the killing as an immediate or decisive motivation, which 
would conflict with the doctrines of the suttas, the Pali commentaries, and 
the earlier and later Abhidharma.36 The Bodhisattvabhūmi, however, does 
not discuss the doctrinal problems arising from such an assumption.
FRUITION OR NO FRUITION?
If the bodhisattva kills intentionally and if the five components—a living 
being, the perception of the living being as such, the thought of killing, the 
action, and the death (of the being) as a result—come together (as explained, 
for example, in the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī and the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya),37 
why is there no fruition of the karma of killing for the bodhisattva—or is 
there?
The Bodhisattvabhūmi boldly states: “Not only will there not be any 
fault, but his merit will much increase.”38 Such statements may have been 
the basis for Śāntideva’s famous statement:
The Merciful One, out of farsightedness, 
permitted prohibited [deeds] to them [i.e., to the bodhisattvas].39
36 The problem also arises that a neutral state of mind would be possible as an immediate 
or decisive motivation since the Bodhisattvabhūmi mentions that state as a possible alterna-
tive to a virtuous state.
37 Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, vol. 1, pp. 69–70, and Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, ch. 4, v. 73 ab. 
38 Bodhisattvabhūmi, Derge vol. 129, fol. 89b, p. 179.
39 Bodhicaryāvatāra, ch. 4, verse 84, lines a–b, Derge vol. 105, fol. 13v, p. 27.
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However, this is not so directly or unambiguously stated in the above 
sutra passages. The Upāyakauśalya states that there is not the least kar-
mic veil for the bodhisattva-mahāsattva who has reduced samsara by one-
hundred-thousand eons, and the Mahārahasya asks, rhetorically, whether 
that reduction and abandoning of samsara constitutes a karmic veil. These 
cumbersome formulations “for someone who has reduced . . . there is no 
veil” and “reduction and abandoning . . . is not a veil” are far from being 
straightforward statements as in the Bodhisattvabhūmi (“Not only will there 
not be any fault, but his merit will much increase.”). It rather appears as if 
both sutras skirt the problem whether any negative karmic fruition occurs at 
all. They seem to argue that someone with such an amount of merit will not 
be in karmic debt, after all, assuming that the merit surplus has equalized 
the debt long ago, in other words, that karmic debt and merit can be offset 
against each other. This is, however, in no way explicitly stated in the text. 
The sutra passages actually do not seem to rule out the possibility that for 
the bodhisattva captain a negative fruition occurred before samsara came to 
an end (earlier than expected). Once again, strictly speaking, both sutra pas-
sages leave room for the possibility that negative karmic fruition occurred 
for the bodhisattva while he was still bound to samsara.
In the immediately following passage, the sutras tell the well-known 
story of the thorn that pierced the Tathāgata’s foot. When Ānanda asks him 
which deed he had done for which this is the fruition, the Tathāgata replies 
that it has been the “residue of the fruition of that deed,”40 referring to the 
bodhisattva captain’s killing of the evil person. In other words, a negative 
fruition has arisen from the killing, of which the thorn is the last residue (Tib. 
lhag ma). Thus, most of the fruition must have occurred at an earlier time. 
The Buddhist tradition, however, does not agree on a single interpretation 
of this and similar incidents (such as the Buddha not receiving alms or eat-
ing poisoned food, et al.). Apparently, the Mahāsāṃghika tradition favors 
an interpretation according to which such incidents were skillful means of 
instructing sentient beings. The Mūlasarvāstivādin tradition, on the other 
hand, accepted the existence of bad karma for the Buddha, albeit as a mere 
faint echo of former bad deeds.41 The present sutras describe the Buddha 
as a superhuman being, whose body is in principle unharmable (Tib. rdo 
40 Upāyakauśalya, Derge vol. 66, fol. 305r line 7, p. 610: las kyi rnam par smin pa’i lhag 
ma ’di yin.
41 Xing 2005, pp. 106–18
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rje’i sku mi tshugs pa’i sku yin).42 In the form they are available to us, they 
indeed frame the story of the thorn into an interpretation according to which 
the piercing of the Buddha’s foot by a thorn is merely a skillful (i.e., didac-
tic) means of convincing a particular group of people of the truth of karmic 
retribution. However, they do not accept it as a karmic veil (Tib. las kyi 
sgrib pa ma yin) of the Buddha, who is merely putting on a show. Thus, the 
sutras ultimately deny that the incident of the thorn is proof of the Buddha 
still possessing karmic remainders. However, within that narrative frame, 
triggered by Ānanda’s question, the thorn is indeed presented as proof of the 
karmic fruition of the former deed. Curiously, Maudgalyāyana, famous for 
his supernatural powers, is completely unable to remove the thorn from the 
world to protect the Buddha. Instead, the thorn follows the Buddha to the 
heaven of the four classes of kings, the heaven of the thirty-three gods on 
top of Sumeru, to the middle of the ocean, and so forth, which must be read 
as an apt illustration of the infallibility and inevitability of karmic fruition. 
Within the narrative framework, the Buddha uses his supernatural power, 
which is obviously stronger than Maudgalyāyana’s power, to cause the kar-
mic residue to appear in the form of this thorn and to follow him wherever 
he goes. By creating this superhuman Buddha, however, these sutras merely 
achieve a special status for the Buddha as being able to conjure up karmic 
residue: “Because such is the skillful means of the Tathāgata, [the step-
ping onto the thorn] is not a karmic veil.”43 Note that this does not argue 
anymore primarily with the Buddha’s vast amount of merit, but with the 
supernormal skill of being able to conjure up karmic residues in any form, 
and it argues that what he has, the power to conjure up, cannot be a veil. 
Moreover, this is not an argument for any bodhisattva being beyond the law 
of karma, but only for the Buddha not being veiled by karma.
However that may be, some Buddhists have interpreted the piercing of the 
thorn simply as an arising of the final residue of the karma of killing the evil 
person, albeit one that has no power to diminish in any way the Buddha’s 
status of being liberated and awakened. One example of a person who main-
tains such a view will be the Tibetan master whose interpretation I introduce 
in the following section. Perceived in this way, such karmic fruition, no mat-
ter how small it may be, still presupposes a nonvirtuous intention at the time 
of the actual deed. Moreover, disregarding the problem of such final fruition, 
the sutras leave open the question of which other ways the negative fruition 
42 Upāyakauśalya, Derge vol. 66, fol. 304v, p. 609.
43 Upāyakauśalya, Derge vol. 66, fol. 305v line 4, p. 611.
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might have manifested during the period the bodhisattva dwelled in samsara 
(however much reduced that period was) before he became the Buddha. In 
any case, the problem of the karmic fruition of the killing is not solved in the 
sutras. It has just been made a lot more complicated.
A TIBETAN SOLUTION
I would now like to discuss the view of a Tibetan master who attempts to 
provide a solution to these problems. He thereby appears to be satisfying 
the Mahayanistic impulses of these stories without neglecting the specifica-
tions of the early suttas and the Abhidharma literature. I have already intro-
duced Jigten Sumgön (’Jig rten gsum mgon; 1143–1217) and his Gongchik 
(dGongs gcig, Single Intention) in previous articles and books.44 Here, I 
will concentrate on some of his pithy one-line instructions, the so-called 
vajra statements (rdo rje’i gsung), from the “Bodhisattva” chapter of his 
most famous work and their explanation by the commentators. As we will 
see, these statements often have in mind the precise issues that we have 
been discussing in the present essay.
If It Is a Transgression, It Must Comprise Affliction
The first vajra statement with direct relation to the present discussion is the 
fifth of the “Bodhisattva” chapter: “There are no transgressions that do not 
comprise afflictions.”45 As the 1633 commentary of Chökyi Dragpa (1559–
1659)46 points out, this statement is a reply to a view similar to what has 
44 His Gongchik (the text of which is included in rDo rje shes rab 2009) is a work that con-
denses the “ineffable” (brjod du med pa) of Mahāmudrā into one hundred and fifty core for-
mulations, the so-called vajra statements (rdo rje’i tshig). The Gongchik weaves the thread 
of Mahāmudrā through the entire fabric of Buddhism. It presents Mahāmudrā as pervading 
disciplined conduct (tshul khrims), meditative concentration (ting nge ’dzin), and discrimi-
native knowledge (shes rab), as well as ground, path, and result (gzhi lam ’bras bu), view, 
practice, and conduct (lta sgom spyod pa), and the “three vows” of prātimokṣa, the bodhi-
sattvas, and mantra. For some remarks on the Gongchik, see Sobisch 2004, 2009a, 2009b, 
2011, and 2015. For a complete translation of the text and one of its major commentaries, 
see Sobisch 2020. For the life of Jigten Sumgön, see Sommerschuh 2014 and 2017.
45 rDo rje shes rab 2009, vol. 3, p. 19; Rin chen byang chub 2008, p. 179; Chos kyi grags 
pa 2007, p. 138: nyon mongs pa can ma yin pa’i ltung ba med.
46 Rigdzin Chökyi Dragpa (Rig ʼdzin chos kyi grags pa) was an important successor of 
Jigten Sumgön. He was the last heir of the Kyura family clan and installed a new system of 
“succession by incaration.” His ouvre comprises fifteen volumes of writings chiefly on the 
meditation practices of Jigten Sumgön’s ʼBri gung bkaʼ brgyud tradition. The third volume 
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been maintained by Sakya Paṇḍita (1182–1251; hereafter referred to using 
the shortened form “Sapaṇ”) in his Domsum Rabye.47 Sapaṇ held that there 
are four categories: (1) transgression, (2) nontransgression, (3) reflection 
of a transgression, and (4) reflection of a nontransgression. Accordingly, 
“to kill with a virtuous intention” would produce only the “reflection of a 
transgression.”48 In his work, Sapaṇ supplies the scriptural authority with a 
quotation from the Catuḥśataka of Āryadeva (ca. 170–270 CE):
Since mind is the principal factor,
all the virtues and nonvirtues
of the bodhisattvas
are virtuous through their intention.49
In his rejoinder, Chökyi Dragpa neither accepts the categories “reflection 
of a transgression” and “reflection of a nontransgression” nor, apparently, 
Catuḥśataka, chapter 5, verse 5, calling such views the “fruitless opinions of 
a scholar.”50 An ostensible “killing with a virtuous motivation” is, according 
to the commentators of the Gongchik, in truth nothing but a general virtuous 
motivation (kun slong dge ba) and, at the moment of the actual act, a nonvir-
tuous execution of the act (sbyor ba mi dge ba). The execution of the act is 
is dedicated to the Gongchik and one other important basic work of Jigten Sumgön, the Theg 
chen bstan pa’i snying po (Essence of the Mahayana Teachings).
47 Sakya Paṇḍita Kunga Gyaltsen opposed in many matters Jigten Sumgön’s teachings. 
His Domsum Rabye (sDom gsum rab dbye, comp. 1232; see Jackson 1987, vol. 1, p. 66) was 
composed after Jigten Sumgön’s death (1217). This was the time when the latter’s nephew 
Sherab Jungné (Shes rab ’byung gnas; 1187‒1241) first started to teach the Gongchik in pub-
lic (Sobisch 2014, p. 198). The commentaries of the Gongchik and the Domsum Rabye indi-
cate that they were in many ways reactions to the teachings that floated around within the 
opponent’s tradition. That is to say, not all statements in these works need to be reactions to 
already published works. There is evidence that teachers of both schools met, and that their 
students received teachings from both traditions.
48 Domsum Rabye, ch. 2, v. 31–32.
49 Domsum Rabye, ch. 2, v. 34. Identified in Rhoton 2002, p. 93, n. 8, as Catuḥśataka, ch. 5, 
v. 5, and cited in the Domsum Rabye as follows: ’phags pa lha yis bzhi brgya par// bsam pas 
byang chub sems dpa’ yi// dge ba’am yang na mi dge ba// thams cad dge ba nyid ’gyur te// 
gang phyir sems de gtso ba’i phyir//. Derge vol. 97, fol. 6r, p. 12, has a number of variants: 
bsam pas byang chub sems dpa’ la// dge’ am ’on te mi dge rung// thams cad dge legs nyid 
’gyur te// gang phyir yid de’i dbang gyur phyir//. 
50 It would be possible for the Drikungpa (’Bri gung pa, the name of Jigten Sumgön’s tra-
dition) to accept Āryadeva’s verse, but only in one particular interpretation (see the section 
“Intention as the Principal Factor,” below). The commentaries, however, do not explain the 
matter in much detail.
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nonvirtuous because at the very moment the captain Great Compassionate is 
stabbing the evil person, he cannot but cultivate aversion. Like the Pali suttas 
and the Abhidharma, the Gongchik maintains the view that compassion can-
not be the decisive motivation at the very moment of the killing. Instead, it 
is rather a general, underlying motive. Chökyi Dragpa states:
If the captain Great Compassionate—even though [his general] 
motivation at the time of the cause is to benefit beings—does not 
cultivate the motivation of hatred at the time [of the actual deed], 
he is unable to stab [the victim with his] weapon. Therefore, the 
fruition of cultivating hatred is what arises later.51
Since the execution of the act is in that way immediately based on a non-
virtuous mind of aversion, the very act of the killing cannot, therefore, be 
merely a “reflection of a transgression,” as Sapaṇ maintains. Instead, it is a 
transgression proper and will, consequently, have painful karmic fruition. 
Āryadeva’s verse states in its first line that “mind is the principal factor.” 
This is also maintained by Jigten Sumgön (see “Intention as the Principal 
Factor,” below). However, he does not accept that there are nonvirtuous acts 
that have virtuous motivations in more than the broadest sense. If such a 
virtuous mind of compassion in the broadest sense underlies an act, it will 
have its own virtuous fruition. However, such a general motivation of com-
passion does not “outshine” (as Vibhūticandra [1170–1220] maintained) the 
immediate motivation of aversion that is necessary for the execution of the 
act of killing. Both motivations come into play and will have their respec-
tive karmic fruitions. Jigten Sumgön speaks in this context of “separate and 
unmixed” karmic fruitions. This is one of several cases where he does not 
accept the categorizations of an Indian scholarly tradition.52 As I have shown 
elsewhere, he rather relies on the Buddha’s words (Skt. buddhavacana) 
themselves as transmitted in sutra and tantra, the experiences of the vajra 
ācāryas of the lineage, the stories that illustrate the dependent origination of 
an event (as found in Jatakas and sutras), and the yogi’s own experiences.53
Intention as the Principal Factor
The Gongchik chapter on the prātimokṣa vows contains a vajra state-
ment that teaches that “in all transgressions, the intention is the principal 
51 Chos kyi grags pa 2007, p. 142 (in the context of ch. 4, vajra statement 7). 
52 Cf. Sobisch 2015.
53 Sobisch 2015, p. 476. 
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factor.”54 Since the intention at the very moment of the killing is indeed 
to harm the evil person, this alone is the principal factor, and that very act 
itself is unavoidably a transgression.55 As we will see later on, it is indeed 
possible that a bodhisattva, under the same general conditions of compas-
sion, commits an act that is usually classified as a transgression, such as 
stealing or telling a lie. However, since he commits that act not only with 
a general intention of compassion, but also with a specific motivation that 
is virtuous at the very moment of the execution of the act, both the general 
and the decisive motivation or immediate cause are to be classified as virtu-
ous. According to Jigten Sumgön, such acts are, therefore, “virtuous in all 
respects,” that is, they have both a virtuous motivation (kun slong dge ba) 
and a virtuous execution of the act (sbyor ba dge ba). I will return to this 
point in a moment. Although Chökyi Dragpa does not discuss Āryadeva’s 
verse in detail, he does say that the line “mind is the principal factor” refers 
to intention (as in Gongchik, ch. 3, vajra statement 6). That is to say that 
if both the general and the immediate motivation is virtuous (as in “virtu-
ous in all respects”), there is indeed no transgression since the mind is the 
principal factor, even though the act may be considered nonvirtuous by one 
who is unable to perceive its underlying motivations.56 Specific examples 
of such acts that are virtuous in all respects—although they may look from 
the outside like transgressions—are discussed below.
Faults and Permissions
To gain a full overview of the complexity of Jigten Sumgön’s thought 
in the context of the vows and conduct of bodhisattvas, let me briefly 
54 Gongchik, ch. 3, vajra statement 6. 
55 As mentioned above, several things have to coincide to make the intentional killing of 
a person successful. The bodhisattva has to recognize the evil person as a person, identify a 
vital organ of the body that—if stabbed with a lance—causes the death of that person, com-
mit the act with a deadly weapon, and satisfy himself that the act was successful, i.e., that 
the person is, in fact, dead. According to the Pali commentaries and Abhidharma texts, this is 
precisely what constitutes a complete transgression that will lead to a negative karmic frui-
tion. 
56 Thus, if we understand “nonvirtuous” in the line “all virtues and nonvirtues of the 
bodhisattvas” as referring to acts that are usually categorized as “nonvirtuous,” but become 
virtuous because the bodhisattva is “skillful in all respects,” i.e., that the bodhisattva acts 
with both a general and immediate virtuous motivation, then it would be acceptable for the 
Drikungpas to say that “all [that is usually seen as] . . . nonvirtues . . . are virtuous through 
their intention,” as Āryadeva says in the Catuḥśataka passage quoted above. 
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introduce here one further important topic, namely the problem of what 
constitutes a fault (nyes pa) and permission (gnang ba). I have already 
referred to Śāntideva, who states in his Bodhicaryāvatāra that the Bud-
dha has given his permission to bodhisattvas to commit acts that he has 
prohibited for others.57 Candragomin made a similar statement in his 
Bodhisattvasaṃvaravimśaka:
Because they possess compassion, and out of love, 
there is no fault for those with a virtuous mind.58
Āryadeva’s Catuḥśataka also belongs to this group of quotations.59 To 
those people who took these quotes of Indian scholars as evidence that the 
Buddha had permitted the bodhisattvas to commit nonvirtuous acts—and 
that is probably the mainstream interpretation in Tibet—Jigten Sumgön 
replied that “there is no permission of a ‘nonvirtuous act that does not 
become a fault.’”60 Rinchen Jangchub (fl. 13th c.), probably writing in the 
1260s, formulates it thus:
Due to the fundamental nature of the dependent origination of 
cause and result, it is not so that such [activities] are permitted 
because they would, thereby, not entail faults.61
In other words, if something is nonvirtuous by its fundamental nature, 
not even the Buddha himself has the power to permit it and thus make it so 
that it would not entail a transgression. The crucial point is, therefore, that 
the bodhisattva must be able to bear the consequences of the transgression, 
since such conduct is, according to Rinchen Jangchub,
[only said to be] permitted in the regard that the bodhisattva does 
not deteriorate through the sufferings of the result of that karma—
namely, the [sufferings of the] three lower realms—and that he is 
able to bear [the consequences]. Therefore, faults do arise! Ask 
yourself: “Will I be able to bear [the consequences] or not?” There 
57 Bodhicaryāvatāra, ch. 5, v. 84cd. 
58 Bodhisattvasaṃvaravimśaka, Derge vol. 138, fol. 167v, p. 335.
59 See Catuḥśataka, ch. 5, v. 5. 
60 Gongchik, ch. 4, vajra statement 6: nyes pa mi ’gyur ba’i mi dge ba gnang ba med. rDo 
rje shes rab 2009, vol. 3, pp. 22–27; Rin chen byang chub 2008, pp. 181–85, Chos kyi grags 
pa 2007, pp. 139–40. 
61 Rin chen byang chub 2008, p. 183. Rinchen Jangchub wrote one of the three most 
important commentaries on the Gongchik. 
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is no other question but to analyze whether sufferings such as 
hunger, thirst, and freezing [in the lower realms] will overpower 
you, and whether your virtuous Dharma conduct will deteriorate 
[as a result]. The Buddha has permitted [such conduct] to those 
bodhisattvas who have attained acceptance of [the fact that] phe-
nomena [are without origin],62 who [can bear to] remain in hell 
for immeasurable eons for the sake of each sentient being, but 
whose virtuous Dharma conduct would not deteriorate through 
those sufferings.63
Dorjé Sherab (ca. 1200–d.u.), writing his commentary in 1267, describes 
the stage of realization of such a bodhisattva in the following way:
The root of not losing the benefit of oneself and others is emptiness 
and compassion. Consequently, if one familiarizes oneself with the 
quintessence of emptiness and compassion, it will be like that. Hav-
ing become steadfast in that regard, even though the negative results 
of engaging in the use of force [as in acts such as killing] ripen, the 
maturation and liberation of sentient beings do occur. However, one 
must stabilize the root of emptiness and compassion.64
In his comments on the eighth vajra statement in chapter 4, Dorjé Sherab 
returns to this point.65 He explains that since both motivation and practice 
are great, it is from the eighth bodhisattva level (Skt. bhūmi) onwards that 
they accomplish the benefit of others in a real sense and are both able to 
engage in special observances (brtul zhugs)66 and endure great suffering. 
They thus may engage in “vast liberality”—a euphemism for the activities 
62 Skt. anutpattikadharmakṣānti, obtained on the eighth level (Skt. bhūmi) of the bodhi-
sattvas.
63 Rin chen byang chub 2008, p. 184. 
64 Dorjé Sherab (rDo rje shes rab) is the author of one of the three most important com-
mentaries of the Gongchik. For the date 1267, see Martin 2001, p. 151, n. 14. rDo rje shes 
rab 2009, vol. 3, p. 25. 
65 rDo rje shes rab 2009, vol. 3, pp. 31‒32.
66 The term “special observances” (brtul zhugs) has a broad range of meanings. It is based 
on the concept of disciplined conduct (tshul khrims; Skt. śīla), but includes those activities 
that, as expressed here (and elsewhere in the Gongchik literature), only bodhisattvas of the 
pure levels (eighth to tenth bhūmi) can master. These observances include for the bodhi-
sattva such practices as the offering of his body and, for the tantric adept, the transgressive 
activities of non-duality. For the latter, see Wedemeyer’s remarks on caryāvrata/vratacaryā; 
Wedemeyer 2013, p. 302.
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discussed here. Note, however, that results accrue even for bodhisattvas of 
the “pure bhūmis” (i.e., of levels eight to ten). For a lesser bodhisattva, the 
results would be unbearable. Only bodhisattvas of the pure levels are able 
to bear such fruition because they have obtained the level of “acceptance of 
the fact that phenomena are without origin.”67
“Unmixed Results”
Let us now return to the discussion of the unmixed results arising from acts 
that have both a general virtuous motivation and a specific nonvirtuous exe-
cution, such as the act of killing with a virtuous motivation. Jigten Sumgön 
states that the negative consequences of an act committed with an immediate 
cause of aversion will come to fruition even if it is based on a general virtu-
ous motivation: “The results of virtue and nonvirtue occur separately.”68 
Dorjé Sherab applies this principle to the case under discussion:
The skill in means that is mixed with hatred is such that [both] 
causes and results arise separately and unmixed. The result of 
that hatred is said to have occurred as both a temporary and an 
ultimate result, [and] through the virtue of the altruistic thought 
[the bodhisattva’s stay in] samsara was reduced by one-hundred-
thousand eons.69
Dorjé Sherab does not explain in detail what the “temporary and ultimate 
results” of hatred are, but we may assume that they are what his contem-
porary, Rinchen Jangchub, explains in the same context as the result of the 
bodhisattva captain’s hatred in the instant of stabbing:
67 Certain abilities are already acquired on the seventh level of the bodhisattvas, but dis-
cussing them would not do much to clarify the key issues of the current context. These abili-
ties are discussed in Sobisch 2020, pp. 323, 344‒45, 360.
68 Gongchik, ch. 4, vajra statement 10. 
69 rDo rje shes rab 2009, vol. 3, p. 28. The wording of the Upāyakauśalya passage, at 
least, suggests that the earlier release from samsara is specifically caused “through the gnosis 
of skill in means,” e.g., the protecting and benefitting of others through killing. Since all oth-
ers involved are benefitted and protected, the bodhisattva captain accumulates much merit. 
Dorjé Sherab mentions here only the “altruistic thought” as the cause of the earlier release. 
That, however, is maintained as the principal thing (“Mind is the principal factor”). It is 
perhaps obvious to him that benefitting and protecting others has virtuous results. In more 
detail, we will see below that the Drikungpas define skill in means as virtuous when it is so 
in all respects of cause (motivation, that is, altruistic thought), path (means or act, that is, 
benefitting and protecting), and result (benefit and protection). 
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The nonvirtuous result, however, is not interrupted by the virtue 
arising from the skillful act. . . . He was born for many hundred 
eons in the hell of sentient beings. Moreover, finally, at the time 
of buddhahood, that piercing of his foot with the acacia thorn was 
precisely a fruition of that karma.70
Thus, as it is explicitly stated here, the temporary result of the nonvirtu-
ous act of the bodhisattva captain is birth in hell (which is neither explic-
itly stated nor denied in the sutras that we have investigated above) and 
the ultimate (i.e., final) result is the piercing of the Buddha’s foot with an 
acacia thorn. The doctrinal background (mentioned by Chökyi Dragpa)71 
is a passage of the Abhidharmasamuccaya,72 which teaches a fourfold divi-
sion of karma into (1) black actions with black results, (2) white actions 
with white results, (3) black and white actions with black and white results, 
and (4) actions with neither black nor white results (leading to the destruc-
tion of karma).73 Of these, the third category is of interest here: within 
the realm of desire (Skt. kāmapratisaṃyukta), there exist actions with (1) 
black intentions and white means and (2) white intentions and black means. 
Some people hold that from such a combination of virtuous and nonvirtu-
ous causes arises a result that is an indistinguishable “combination of black 
and white.”74 It is precisely this that is rejected by Jigten Sumgön, who 
maintains that the result is not an admixture or complete merging, or fusing, 
of the black and white components. Instead, as repeated many times in the 
Gongchik and its commentaries, such a result is a combination of black and 
white elements, where the black results arise from black actions, and the 
white results arise from white actions. Chökyi Dragpa states:
If one plants, for example, a mixture of barley and peas in a field, 
one may apply the label “mixed barley and peas” to it, but in real-
70 Rin chen byang chub 2008, p. 186. 
71 See Chökyi Dragpa 2007, p. 149.
72 One can find the passage at the end of ch. 1, sect. 2, of the Abhidharmasamuccaya; see 
Rahula 2001, pp. 126–27. For these four kinds of actions see also A vol. 4, p. 235, and M 
vol. 1, p. 387.
73 According to Schmithausen 1986, p. 207, the latter “neither-black-nor-white karma” is a 
division where the intention (cetanā) is to abandon all retributive karma. It is anāsrava (zag 
pa med pa). Its definition differs in later treatises and commentaries. Bayer 2010, pp. 240, 
400.
74 The Gonchik commentaries usually do not identify their opponents. In this particular 
case, it clearly makes one think of Sapaṇ; see for instance Domsum Rabje, ch. 1, v. 46, and 
Rhoton 2002, p. 47.
S O B I S C H :  “ C O M PA S S I O N AT E  K I L L I N G ” 169
ity, from barley ripens barley, and from peas ripen peas, and apart 
from that nothing else.75
Similarly, the Aṅguttara Nikāya and the Majjhima Nikāya already 
explain,76 for instance, that beings born in the human world experience 
their world for this reason (that is, because of “mixed karma”) sometimes 
as heavenly and sometimes as hellish experiences—but obviously not both 
contradictory experiences at the very same moment, or not fused into one 
experience. Therefore, to claim that the case where the captain killed with a 
virtuous motivation is an example of a “black action with a white result” is 
problematic. The white result that is experienced by the captain consists in 
the reduction of the number of eons he has to remain in samsara. It is still a 
result arising from virtue, namely the virtuous intention, as explicitly stated 
in Dorjé Sherab’s commentary above.77 The white result is not the result 
of the nonvirtue, that is, the decisive or immediate motivation at the time 
of the killing and consisting of the necessary moment of aversion. Thus, in 
contrast to what was analyzed for the sutras above, Jigten Sumgön does not 
maintain an “equalizing of the karmic debt” through merit, and he does not 
assume that karmic debt and merit can be offset against each other.
Skillful in All Respects
The last topic that helps to illuminate the complexity of Jigten Sumgön’s 
thoughts on this matter is, as already mentioned above, his idea of what 
constitutes bodhisattva conduct that is “skillful in all respects.” This is an 
important point since only conduct that is skillful in all respects is com-
pletely free from all negative consequences. He comments upon conduct 
that is not skillful completely in all its respects as follows: “If a nonvirtuous 
[deed] occurs, its result will arise [even] for one who is skilled with regard 
to means.”78 Rinchen Jangchub states:
If at [the times of ] cause, path, or result, there is any kind of mix-
ture of [virtue and] nonvirtue, it is not [in all respects] skilled with 
regard to means. The [perfect] skill in means of the bodhisattva 
75 Chos kyi grags pa 2007, p. 75.
76 See A vol. 4, p. 235, and M vol. 1, p. 387.
77 gZhan don bsam pa’i dge bas, rDo rje shes rab 2009, vol. 3, p. 28.
78 Gongchik, ch. 4, vajra statement 7. rDo rje shes rab 2009, vol. 3, pp. 27‒29; Rin chen 
byang chub 2008, pp. 185‒87; Chos kyi grags pa 2007, pp. 141‒42: thabs la mkhas pa la mi 
dge ba yod na de’i ’bras bu ’byung. 
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is such that all of cause, path, and result is virtuous and without 
nonvirtue in all respects—that is [what we] call “skilled with 
regard to means” [in the real sense].79
Thus, the captain Great Compassionate did not act skillfully in all 
respects and, therefore, had to experience the temporary and ultimate results 
of the nonvirtuous act of killing a human being, whereby he was running 
the risk of losing the path. As Dorjé Sherab puts it: “If the old fox jumps 
from the lion’s jumping place, he will break his back. . . . It is paramount at 
first to practice conduct that is skilled in means unmixed with nonvirtue.”80
Three Levels of Bodhisattva Practice
We can now derive from the teachings of the Gongchik a system of three 
levels of bodhisattva practice with regard to skill in means and the mixing of 
virtuous and nonvirtuous causes. The supreme level is the bodhisattva from 
the eighth level onwards. For him, there is no difference whether he experi-
ences painful results or not, since he has attained acceptance of the fact that 
phenomena are without origin. The medium level is a bodhisattva slightly 
below that level, who has not yet attained that acceptance but is robust 
enough to bear painful consequences to some extent. All bodhisattvas below 
that level are advised to refrain completely from all nonvirtuous acts. Thus, 
the manner of the bodhisattvas’ practice and conduct depends entirely on the 
bodhisattva’s level of accomplishment. Concerning the level of the beginner 
bodhisattva, Jigten Sumgön speaks of conduct that is “skillful in all respects.” 
Such conduct completely refrains from all nonvirtuous motivations, acts, and 
means. Our commentators provide in this context three examples: the cases 
of King Kanakarvarṇa, the Brahmin Jyotis, and the Rishi Agnidatta. 
King Kanakarvarṇa’s story is documented in the section of Dorjé She-
rab’s commentary that contains illustrative stories (Tib. lo rgyus).81 The key 
79 Rin chen byang chub 2008, pp. 185‒86. 
80 rDo rje shes rab 2009, vol. 3, p. 29: seng ges [read: ge’i] mchongs sar wa rgan gyis 
mchongs na rked pa chag pa . . . thabs mkhas pa’i spyod pa mi dge ba dang ma ’dres par 
byed pa thog mar gal che gsungs/.
81 rDo rje she rab 2009, vol. 3, p. 102; Kanakavarṇapūrvayoga, D vol. 76, with this 
story starting on fol. 51r. See also the Kanakavarṇa Sutra, which is part of the larger 
Divyāvadāna. To my knowledge, this part of the Divyāvadāna has not yet been translated; 
for its first part, see the edition by Vaidya (1959) and the translation by Rotman (2008). On 
the sections of Dorjé Sherab’s commentary, where he provides evidence in the form of illus-
trating stories (mostly from the sutras), see Sobisch 2015, p. 479. 
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points that concern us here are the following. When astrologers inform the 
king that a long-lasting famine will befall his kingdom, he has the stocked 
provisions of all his subjects collected and stored in his palace. Then, dur-
ing the famine, when everything, including his private stocks, is spent on all 
subjects, the king hands over his last bowl of rice to a mendicant. Miracu-
lously, the famine ends thereby. Dorjé Sherab states:
King Kanakavarṇa did not become a thief. Since—no matter what 
their status—that king was the lord of all beings, he appropri-
ated all their wealth. Therefore, having gathered all their wealth, 
the ones who [previously] had wealth were without many goods 
afterward, and those who [previously] were without wealth did 
not die from hunger because [the king] took care of all of them 
alike. Apart from doing just that, he did not gather wealth desir-
ing it for himself. Since he gathered [wealth] only for the peoples’ 
benefit, it was solely a virtuous motivation, unmixed with the 
three poisons. Thus, it was faultless skillful conduct.82
The difference between the stories of King Kanakavarṇa and the bodhi-
sattva captain Great Compassionate is that the king did not have the inten-
tion to steal his subjects’ wealth, whereas the captain wanted the evil person 
to be dead. In particular, it was possible for the king to gather together the 
wealth while he was free from selfish desire because all he needed to culti-
vate was the wish to benefit all beings alike. The captain, however, neces-
sarily needed to produce a moment of aversion for the killing. The captain’s 
aggressive means of ending the life of the evil person was essential to the 
whole plan; without it, his plan to save the evil person from committing a 
further act of evil and the merchants from killing him would not have been 
possible. Gathering together and storing wealth, however, can be done with-
out any desire to own the wealth for oneself.
The second example is that of the Brahmin Jyotis. He gave up celibacy 
for twelve years for the benefit of a Brahmin’s daughter, who had fallen in 
love with him. According to both the sutra and Dorjé Sherab’s commentary, 
she threatened to kill herself if the handsome Brahmin would not move in 
with her. He did so out of compassion for twelve years, even though he 
fully expected to have to go to hell for breaking celibacy. However, hav-
ing practiced celibacy before for twenty thousand years, having returned 
to celibacy after she passed away, and then practicing the brahmavihāras 
82 rDo rje shes rab 2009, vol. 3, p. 26.
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intensively until the very moment of his death, he was born in the Brahma 
world in the moment after his death, and also reduced his samsaric exis-
tence by many eons.83 However, the story (also recounted in Dorjé Sherab’s 
commentary) clearly mentions that Jyotis “cultivated a resolve of great 
compassion that was accompanied by improper desire” (’dod pa ngan pa 
dang ldan pa), and thus, the story is unconvincing.84
The third and final example is the story of the Rishi Agnidatta.85 Agni-
datta lived in a forest where one day an escaped thief appeared. Agnidatta 
instructed him immediately not to make himself visible to him. Later, when 
asked if he had seen the thief, Agnidatta could not say that he had, because 
that would have been a lie. However, he got into trouble when he said he did 
not see him because the king found out that his soldiers had caught the thief in 
Agnidatta’s forest. When the king ordered his men to cut off the Rishi’s limbs 
(whom he deemed to be a liar and thus a fake Rishi), Agnidatta bestowed 
teachings on him, and the king understood that Agnidatta was not a liar.86 In 
sum, he skillfully avoided a lie and thus saved the thief from the executioners 
without committing a nonvirtuous deed of speech. It might be argued that he 
had known that the thief had escaped to his forest, but, technically speaking, 
he did not reply to the interrogators’ question using untrue words. It is further-
more to his credit that by instructing the thief to remain invisible to him he 
made a conscious effort to avoid a situation where he would have to tell a lie.
If the latter two examples are not fully satisfactory, they might still illus-
trate how carefully a bodhisattva has to consider his acts. If he does not find 
a way to remain completely virtuous, he must abstain from the act or be 
prepared to bear the consequences.
83 The story of Jyotis is from the Sarvabuddhamahārahasya Upāyakauśalya Sutra, 
Derge vol. 44, where it begins on fol. 37r5, p. 74, line 5. One can also find it in the Ārya 
Upāyakauśalya Mahāyānasūtra, Derge vol. 66, where it begins on fol. 288r, p. 576. 
Śāntideva, too, cites it in his Śikṣāsamuccaya, Derge vol. 111, on fol. 93v, p. 187 (from the 
Upāyakauśalya Mahāyāna Sūtra; English translation by Bendall and Rouse 1990, p. 163). 
For the story as it is transmitted in the Drikung tradition, see rDo rje shes rab 2009, vol. 3, 
pp. 103‒4; Repa 2006, pp. 165‒66. 
84 Sometimes it is not easy to get the point of such stories. In the Tibetan tradition, they 
may have been retold or summarized from sources that were already of secondary nature. 
Even present-day scholars of the tradition sometimes appear to be uncertain about their pre-
cise meaning.
85 rDo rje shes rab 2009, vol. 3, pp. 104‒6.
86 It is not clear whether the fact that the teaching was on the doctrine of non-self plays a 
role here. Perhaps, understanding the selflessness of beings, the king realized that a person 
can, ultimately, not be seen? 
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CONCLUSION
Rupert Gethin has, among other things, documented three points of the Pali 
and Abhidharma literature concerning the Buddhist doctrine of acts and 
their results that I believe are fundamental to this whole debate: 
1.  Actions that are categorized as virtuous or nonvirtuous always have an 
underlying intention, which is again motivated by one of the six roots 
of greed or non-attachment, hatred or friendliness, and delusion or wis-
dom.
2.  The intention to kill can (at least according to the Pali suttas and the 
Abhidharmas) never be motivated by nonattachment, friendliness, or 
wisdom.
3.  When the intention to kill, rooted in greed, hatred, or delusion, leads to 
an act that has a clearly perceived living being as an object and comes 
to completion through the actual death of that being, the result of suf-
fering must and will arise.
Are the two Upāya sutras that were investigated here trying to skirt this 
problem? The bodhisattva captain clearly expects painful fruition, but the 
sutras avoid spelling out any negative consequences in the crucial passages. 
They admit a karmic fruition occurring to the Buddha, but as they frame 
that story, this was only one of his didactic tricks. However, even if it is 
admitted, as it is claimed by one part of the tradition, that the Buddha can-
not still have a veil of karma, this does not mean that bodhisattvas do not 
accumulate karma through nonvirtuous deeds. These two sutras may only 
be read to maintain, as they are by some, that for becoming a Buddha, the 
bodhisattvas must first completely purify all their karmic veils. 
In these sutra passages, “means” seems to refer foremost to the exceptional 
method (killing), and “skill” to the bodhisattva’s ability to accomplish the 
welfare of others even with such an act of evil. Implicit within the skill is the 
bodhisattva’s insight into exactly how his intervention will play out for the 
other beings. However—and this is crucial—the bodhisattva clearly acts in 
both sutras under the explicit expectation that suffering will accrue for him. 
The Mahārahasyopāyakauśalya even states that he “shall happily endure that 
experience of suffering.” The Bodhisattvabhūmi differs in several respects 
from these sutras. In one interpretation, the bodhisattva has a concrete plan of 
how to avoid any negative consequences for himself. In an alternative inter-
pretation of this passage, his skillful insight allows him to kill the evil person 
in the moment when that person is in a mental state that is most conducive 
for a good rebirth. The Bodhisattvabhūmi, furthermore, explicitly states that 
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  4 9 ,  1  &  2174
it is “imprudent” for the bodhisattva to go to hell and that “there will not only 
be no fault, but his merit will much increase.” Taken together, all this indi-
cates that this treatise indeed assumes that it is within the bodhisattva’s abili-
ties to avoid negative consequences for himself. In fact, an essential element 
of the “skill” of the bodhisattva here is that he is able to commit a transgres-
sion without having to face the usual negative consequences.
Curiously, although compassion is mentioned in our three Indian sources, 
apart from being merely a general underlying attitude, its functioning as the 
decisive or immediate motivation of the killing is not visible in these texts. 
In fact, the label “compassionate killing” is rather misleading as it implies 
a central role of compassion in the very act of killing. Thus, overestimating 
the role of compassion may cloud our perception of what these sutras really 
are about: they are, above all, about skillful means of accumulating the vast 
amounts of merit necessary on the bodhisattva’s path to buddhahood.
Jigten Sumgön has a congenial and creative approach to the matter, and 
he makes a special effort to integrate all three vehicles of Buddhism.87 In 
particular, he is not trying to explain away the problem that Gethin, based 
on the Pali literature and Abhidharma, calls the “psychological impos-
sibility” of the claim that an aggressive act could be committed out of 
friendliness. According to Jigten Sumgön, killing must involve aversion 
and therefore will have aggravating fruition. The crucial point is the bodhi-
sattva’s abilities and his level of realization. If he is a beginner, he should 
keep his hands off of such practices since the consequences will ruin him. 
His skill is to keep strictly within the boundaries of virtue and to skillfully 
avoid nonvirtuous activity in all respects. If he has solidified his ground-
ing in compassion, he may be able to bear the suffering to some extent and, 
therefore, may be “permitted” to commit faults as far as he is able to bear 
the consequences. If, additionally, he has obtained the level of the “accep-
tance of the fact that phenomena are without origination,” he is “permitted” 
to take suffering upon himself because there is no danger anymore that he 
would lose his resolve and path. The term “permission,” however, is not 
used in any literal sense. It does not mean that because the Buddha allows 
it, there will be no consequences. The Buddha’s permission is based on a 
consideration of the bodhisattva’s abilities to bear the consequences. Nei-
ther the bodhisattva nor even the Buddha himself is beyond karmic frui-
87 His efforts to include the Vajrayana context are not mentioned in the present essay. Jig-
ten Sumgön’s teaching concerning the integrated, consistent, and simultaneous practice of 
all three vehicles by a single person is discussed in Sobisch 2002, ch. 14.
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tion, and even the Buddha cannot suspend the universal laws of karma and 
dependent origination for the bodhisattva.
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